Duration
06 Jul 2026 - 10 Jul 2026
In the spring of 1989, an academic conference sponsored by scholars associated with the leftist journal Praxis International was held in Dubrovnik, the world-renowned historic city in what was then the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, under the title “The End of Utopia?” In the summer of the same year, the liberal scholar Francis Fukuyama published an article in The National Interest titled “The End of History?” In the autumn of that year, the Berlin Wall fell—an event later described by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas as signaling “the end of socialist illusion” in his essay “What Does Socialism Mean Today?”
Thirty-seven years later, we find ourselves at a historical moment that is at once very different from, and strikingly similar to, 1989. It is different because none of the major actors in the events of 1989 in that part of the world now seems fully satisfied with what has followed. It is similar because, once again, people across the globe are talking about the “end” of something. In light of the developments of the past decades, we propose holding another academic conference in
Dubrovnik to reflect on the times into which we have been drawn, under the title “The End of Liberal Modernity?”
For most of the years after 1989, the liberal mode of modernity appeared to be the clear winner in the competition among ideologies and social systems. This was
evident not only in the successive integration of the “new” European countries into the European Union in the 1990s and early twenty-first century, but also in the rapid development of some countries in the Global South—particularly China—after its entry into the liberal world order through accession to the WTO in 2001. Even in his 1990 defense of socialism, Habermas seemed to argue for integrating socialist aspirations with characteristically liberal values such as the market economy, the rule of law, and civil society.
For a range of reasons, however, this period—often described in terms of the “Third Way” or a tendency toward “convergence”—is now widely seen as having come to an end. Over the last one or two decades, we have witnessed the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories across social media platforms; growing doubt about, and protest against, globalization among those who feel left behind by it; and the worldwide rise of authoritarian populism and nationalism.
These trends not only undermine the prospects of a liberal social order but also challenge many of its core assumptions. We ask: Can the free flow of information and unrestricted communication still be expected to generate truth and consensus? Is it realistic to hope for a world order grounded in rational dialogue and equal respect, rather than mutual threat? Does individual freedom exacerbate historical injustices against marginalized groups, or can it play a positive role in remedying
them? More fundamentally, is political society destined to become a battleground among hostile comprehensive doctrines? These questions are highly abstract, yet also urgent, and they confront philosophers concerned with the fate of liberalism.
Recent scholarship has indeed developed new lines of thought on these issues. For example, political realists (such as Bernard Williams and Gerald Gaus) attempt to ground liberalism on a thinner moral basis, while perfectionists (such as David Enoch and Alex Lefebvre) argue that liberalism can be renewed only by appealing to a substantive conception of the good life. Rawlsian political liberals (such as Stephen Macedo, Gina Schouten, Gabriele Badano, and Alasia Nuti)—though
often criticized for underestimating illiberal challenges in the real world—have also engaged directly with illiberal adversaries. Beyond traditional liberal frameworks, some theorists (such as William Edmundson and Christine Sypnowich) have defended socialist ideas and sought to incorporate
socialist insights into contemporary debates on social justice.
Taken together, these works revive the classical debate over the best political regime in the history of political philosophy and deepen our understanding of liberalism. In addition to these theoretical works, most of which have been produced in Europe and North America, we should also mention the ideas proposed and developed in China over the past decades in response to its rapid economic development and profound social transformations.
To advance these discussions further, we propose this symposium under the general title “The End of Liberal Modernity?”, focusing on the following themes:
1. Can political liberalism justify its superiority over illiberal doctrines?
2. Does liberalism presuppose or promote a particular way of life?
3. How can political realism provide a normative justification for liberal democracy?
4. How is a socialist approach to distributive justice possible today?
5. What new concepts or vocabulary can a critical theory of our time offer to
those still committed to “the unfinished project of modernity”?
6. Are the neo-Marxist theories developed before 1989, both in the West and in the East, still
relevant today?
7. What experiences and lessons can China share with those outside China who
are searching for an alternative to the liberal mode of modernity?
